Office-Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
AUG 9 1982
ALEXANDER L. STEVAS,
CLERK

82-259

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1982

NANCY B. BEECHER, et al.,
Petitioners,

v.

BOSTON CHAPTER, NAACP, et al.,
and
PEDRO CASTRO, et al.,
Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI
ATTORNEY GENERAL

THOMAS R. KILEY
First Assistant Attorney General
One Ashburton Place
Boston, MA 02108

Counsel of Record

THOMAS A. BARNICO
Assistant Attorney General
MARC S. SEIGLE
Special Assistant Attorney General
Government Bureau,
One Ashburton Place
Boston, MA 02108
(617) 727-1004

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the district court impermissibly superseded a valid Massachusetts civil service seniority statute in cases dealing with hiring practices by entering remedial orders requiring that percentages of minority members of municipal police and fire departments be maintained despite significant layoffs in those departments.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
QUESTION PRESENTED	i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	iv
OPINIONS BELOW	2
JURISDICTION	3
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES INVOLVED	4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE	5
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT	23
I. Introduction: This Petition Raises Important Questions Regarding the Relationship Between the Remedial Powers of the Federal Judiciary And the Authority of the States to Establish Seniority Systems for State and Local Government Employees.	23
II. The Lower Courts Erred By Superseding A Valid Massachusetts Statute Never Challenged In This Case.	30

PAGE

III. The Decision of the First Circuit Contradicts Recent Decisions of This Court Upholding Bona Fide Seniority Systems. 43

IV. The Lower Court Decisions Contradict Principles Of Federalism Embodied In the Tenth Amendment And Applied By This Court In National League Of Cities v. Usery. 51

CONCLUSION 56

APPENDIX (Under separate cover, Supreme Court Rule 21.1 (k))

APPENDIX A. Opinion of the First Circuit, Boston Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965 (1st Cir. 1982).

APPENDIX B. Opinion of the District Court, 522 F.Supp. 873 (D. Mass. 1981).

APPENDIX C. Judgment Of The First Circuit

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

	PAGE
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 1534 (1982)	24, 45, 46
Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 371 F.Supp. 507 (D. Mass. 1974)	3n, 16-18
Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975)	3n, 18
Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 423 F.Supp. 696 (D. Mass. 1976)	3n
Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965 (1st. Cir. 1982)	Passim
Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1981)	28
Castro v. Beecher, 334 F. Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 1971)	3n, 8, 9, 40
Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st. Cir. 1972)	3n, 9n, 10, 11, 40
Castro v. Beecher, 365 F. Supp. 655 (D. Mass. 1973)	3n, 11, 12, 39n
Castro v. Beecher, 386 F. Supp. 1281 (D. Mass. 1975)	3n, 12

PAGE

Castro v. Beecher, 522 F.Supp. 873 (D. Mass. 1981) 3

Croker v. Boeing Co. (Vertol Div.) 437 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Pa. 1977) 44, 49

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 2126 (1982) 53

Franks v. Bowman Transportation, 424 U.S. 747 (1975) 48, 51

Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) 37, 38, 39

Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 282 (1976) 32

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) 24, 44, 47

Massachusetts Teachers Association v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, Mass. Adv. Sh. (1981) 1764, 424 N.E. 2d 469 29n

Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) 26, 32, 36

Morgan v. O'Bryant, 671 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1982) 28, 35

National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) 28, 52

PAGE

Pasadena v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) 26, 33-35

Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Commission, 318 U.S. 261 (1943) 52

Pullman-Standard v. Swint, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 1781 (1982) 25, 45, 46

State of New Hampshire v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240 (1st. Cir. 1980) 54n

Stotts v. Memphis Fire Department, 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982) 28, 47

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Eduction, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) 32

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) 46

United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64 (D.D.C. 1979) 52

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) 27, 32, 40, 41

Youngblood v. Dalzell, 568 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1978) 28

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

PAGE

United States Constitution

Tenth Amendment 52

Fourteenth Amendment 8

Federal Statutes

28 U.S.C. §1651, All Writs Act 12

42 U.S.C. §1983 16

42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(h) 43

Massachusetts Statutes

Mass. General Laws, c. 31, §6 11

Mass. General Laws, c. 31, §39 6, 15, 22

Mass. St. 1980, c. 580 23n

Mass. St. 1982, c. 190 23n

Miscellaneous

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) 5

NO.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1982

NANCY B. BEECHER, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

BOSTON CHAPTER, NAACP, et al.,

and

PEDRO CASTRO, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

The petitioners, the Massachusetts Personnel Administrator and members of the Massachusetts Civil Service Commission, respectfully request that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judg-

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, entered in this consolidated proceeding May 11, 1982. 1/

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is reported at 679 F.2d 965 (1st Cir. 1982) and appears in the appendix hereto. 2/ The opinion of the United States

---

1/ The other parties to the consolidated appeals in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit were as follows: Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718, defendant-intervenor in the District Court proceeding; and Boston Police Patrolmen's Association, Inc., defendant-intervenor in the same proceeding. The City of Boston, a defendant in that proceeding, took no appeal from the District Court decision.

2/ The appendix accompanying this petition will be designated "(A.)." The First Circuit appendices for the police and firefighter cases will be respectively designated "(1st Cir. P.A.)" and "(1st Cir. F.A.)."

District Court for the District of Massachusetts is reported at 522 F. Supp. 873 (D. Mass. 1981) and also appears in the appendix hereto. 3/

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was entered on May 11, 1982. This petition was filed within ninety days of

---

3/ Previous opinions of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in these cases are reported at: Castro v. Beecher, 334 F.Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 1971); 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); 365 F.Supp. 655 (D. Mass. 1973); 386 F.Supp. 1281 (D. Mass. 1975); Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 371 F.Supp. 507 (D. Mass. 1974); 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); 423 F.Supp. 696 (D. Mass. 1976). The lower courts and the parties have referred to the cases elliptically as the "police" and "fire" cases.

that date. This Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES INVOLVED[4/]

Constitution of the United States, Amendments X and XIV

42 U.S.C. §1983

42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(h)

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 31, §6.

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 31, §39.

Mass. St. 1980, c. 580

Mass. St. 1982, c. 190

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)

4/ See the addendum to this petition for texts of provisions.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Introduction

This petition arises from an order entered by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in these consolidated [5/] cases on August 7, 1981, and a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirming that order. The District Court's order, granting plaintiffs' motion to modify prior remedial orders pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), directed City of Boston and Massachusetts officials to take certain actions to maintain the percentage of black and

---

5/ The police and fire cases maintained separate identities throughout their histories, see pp. 7-19, infra, until they were consolidated for purposes of hearing and decision on plaintiffs' motions to modify prior remedial orders filed April 6, 1981.

Spanish-surnamed post-probationary police and fire officers in the Boston Police and Fire Departments, despite personnel reductions in those departments. Specifically, the district court ordered that lay-offs of officers due to lack of funds not be made pursuant to a state civil service seniority statute, Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. c. 31, §39, but rather by a procedure designed to maintain the percentages of black and Spanish-surnamed officers on the respective forces.

On May 11, 1982, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's order. A. 91. The court ruled that "[t]he district court had the equitable power to modify the consent decrees, that the Massachusetts statutory last hired, first fired seniority system is not insulated

from the court's orders, and that the orders are not unconstitutional." 679 F.2d at 978 (A. 63). The court rejected the state defendants' contentions that the district court's order impermissibly superseded a valid Massachusetts civil service seniority statute, erred by modifying its prior remedial orders in the absence of sufficient evidence of changed circumstances, and erred by modifying its prior remedial orders when none of those prior orders addressed reductions in force.

The state defendants filed the present petition for a writ of certiorari on August 9, 1981.

Prior Judicial Proceedings

The consolidated cases before the Court have extended judicial pedigrees. [6/] Plaintiffs commenced the police case in 1970 on behalf of a class of persons composed of "all black and Spanish-surnamed persons who have sought, or might have sought, or may hereafter seek employment as policemen in positions covered by Massachusetts civil service laws." Castro v. Beecher, 334 F. Supp. 930, 934 (D. Mass. 1971) (Wyzanski, J.). Their original claims, which were based on the Fourteenth Amendment, were summarized as follows:

> The claim is that among the practices by which defendants have excluded, limited, and discouraged the employment of black and Spanish-surnamed persons are (a) furnishing

---

6/ The opinions of the lower courts included in the appendix to this writ set forth the course of the police and fire litigation and, accordingly, the petitioners only summarize the salient points of the cases here.

> on a discriminatory basis information about police employment opportunities, (b) establishing educational requirements not bearing upon any legitimate job qualifications, (c) requiring police applicants to submit to a written examination which has not been validated as predictive of successful job performance in the position of policeman and (d) requiring police applicants to submit to other miscellaneous job requirements, such as a height test and a swim test.

Id. After trial, the district court held that "the general intelligence type of police examinations given in 1968, 1969, and 1970 by the Civil Service Commission were not rationally or empirically significantly related to the capacity of applicants to be trained for and to perform a policeman's job." Id. at 924. 7/

7/ The district court also held, and the First Circuit affirmed, that the recruiting had been "adequately and fairly conducted, and that the educational, height, and swim test requirements all had a significant relation to a policeman's job performance." Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 729 (1st Cir. 1972).

An appeal followed to the First Circuit. That Court affirmed the bulk of the district court's findings, see footnote 7, but concluded that the unintentional discrimination represented by the civil service examination was racial in nature. The Court suggested that the district court's remedy was based on its "characterization of the 1968-1970 examinations as discriminating broadly against all non-mainstream whites." Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 736 (1st Cir. 1972). The Court stated further: "Our contrary view of the discrimination leads us to remedial measures differently affecting both those now on eligible lists and the class (of blacks and Spanish-surnamed persons) represented by plaintiffs." Id. Those remedial measures included: a "new examination," "priority pool[ing]" for class members

and "certification" by the Director of Civil Service, according to the priority pools, in response to requisitions submitted by police departments. Id. at 737; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 31, §6. 8/

On remand the district court approved and entered a consent decree, Castro v. Beecher, 365 F. Supp. 655 (1973). The consent decree in the appendix to Judge Wyzanski's 1973 opinion contained four sub-sections: "Certifications"; "Future Examinations"; "Recruitment"; and "Reporting." These subsections set forth specific obligations of the parties designed to correct violations found in

---

8/ Although review of the First Circuit decision was not sought in this Court, it was subsequently characterized as "wrongly decided" in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.12 (1976). See pp. 39-42 infra.

previous examination and certification procedures. Id. at 661-662.

In 1975 plaintiffs brought an action pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C §1651, seeking injunctive relief to preserve the effect of certification and appointment procedures established by the 1973 Castro consent decree in light of certain statutory preferences contained in Massachusetts civil service law. The district court ordered the Civil Service Commission "to certify candidates on the basis of priorities established by the Consent Decree and to give effect to Massachusetts statutory preferences . . . only within each of the Groups." Castro v. Beecher, 386 F. Supp. 1281, 1285 (D. Mass. 1975) (emphasis supplied).

On July 7, 1975, the district court approved and entered a consent decree "in accordance with" its January 7, 1975, opinion and order. The consent decree (1st Cir. P.A. 112) provided for "the establishment of priority certification groups for police applicants, for an affirmative recruitment program for black and Hispanic applicants and for procedures for administration and reporting with respect to police entrance examinations." 1st Cir. P.A. 43. The decree also provided that "[a]s a city or town achieves a complement of minorities commensurate with the percentage of minorities within the community, certification shall be made according to existing Massachusetts law." 1st Cir. P.A. 122-123.

On July 13, 1976, the district court approved and entered a "Supplemental Consent Decree." 1st Cir. P.A. 124. The preface to this decree read:

> This Court having approved and entered a Consent Decree in this action on July 7, 1975, to allow a new police officer entrance examination to be given, and said examination having been given in October, 1975, the parties agree to this Supplemental Consent Decree to permit the marking of said examination and the establishment of an eligibility list for the position of police officer in the Commonwealth.

On July 1, 1979, the district court approved and entered an "Agreement As To May, 1978 Examination" signed by all parties to this action. 1st Cir. P.A. 132. The agreement provided for various administrative and procedural tasks necessary to fulfill the remedial obligations regarding examination, certification, and recruitment established by the prior decrees.

At no time during this lengthy process did the plaintiffs ever mount a challenge to the seniority provisions which underlie the current dispute. Only with their filing of a "motion to modify prior remedial orders" on April 6, 1981, some eleven years after the original complaint was filed and two years after the parties' last agreement concerning the hiring process, did the plaintiffs ask the district court to override the provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws. c. 31, §39.

The Fire Case

Unsuccessful black and hispanic applicants for appointment as City of Boston fire fighters and the Boston Chapter of the NAACP commenced the fire case in 1972. As in the police case, the plaintiffs claimed racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981

and 1983 in connection with recruitment and certification practices established by the Massachusetts Civil Service Commission and implemented through appointing procedures.

In 1973 the Attorney General of the United States brought an action raising similar claims, together with Title VII claims, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the two actions were consolidated.

Following hearings, the district court found that blacks represented approximatley 16 percent of Boston's population, that the combined minority population was 23 percent of the total, and that blacks and hispanics represented only 0.9 percent of the fire department's sworn personnel. Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher et al., 371 F. Supp. at 514 (Freedman J.). The court found that

plaintiffs had established an unrebutted case of racial discrimination. The court found, as evidenced by the "insignificant" number of blacks and hispanics certified, that the examinations administered from 1968 through August 1971 were discriminatory. It also found that the word-of-mouth recruitment policy resulted in unintentional racial discrimination. Id. at 510, 515, 519-20.

The district court ordered a program of active recruitment of minority fire fighters, enjoined further certification based upon the results of the discriminatory examinations, ordered development of a job-related examination, and required establishment of priority certification groups for blacks and hispanic applicants. Id. at 520-23. It also ordered that the remedial measures

its decree remain in force for any city or town with a minority population greater than one per cent until the fire department of the municipality "achieves a complement of minorities commensurate with the percentage of minorities within the community" at which time "certifications will be made according to existing Massachusetts law." Id. at 523.

The First Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiffs had demonstrated that the Massachusetts civil service test had a disproportionate impact on minority hiring and that defendants had not demonstrated job relatedness. Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher et al., 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).

Since the 1974 decree, the district court entered several interim consent decrees and stipulations. These subsequent orders have set procedures for administration of new examinations, establishment of eligibility lists, affirmative recruitment, and notice and reporting. As in the police case, however, plaintiffs never mounted a challenge to the statutory seniority provisions which underlie the current dispute until their "motion to modify prior remedial orders" of April 6, 1981.

Statement of Facts

The relevant facts in this most recent chapter in the police and fire cases draw their full flavor and color from the financial events occurring in the City of Boston in the spring and summer of 1981. Reference to employment

patterns in the Police and Fire Departments from 1970 to the present, however, is required to fully outline the factual basis for modification submitted by the plaintiffs and accepted by the district court.

Stipulations signed by the plaintiffs and the city defendants and submitted on July 30, 1981, and August 3, 1981, set forth these employment patterns and formed the factual basis of this case. In 1970, 2.3 percent of the 2804 sworn officers employed by the Boston Police Department were black or Hispanic. At the same time, the black and Hispanic population of the city was 16.3 percent. In 1974, prior to entry of the decree in the fire case, 0.9 percent of Boston's firefighters were black or Hispanic. At that time, those minorities comprised

approximately 23 percent of Boston's population.

Between 1974 and 1980 the percentage of minority police officers and firefighters on the Boston forces increased dramatically. During this period, the Boston Police Department hired 492 officers, of whom 213 (43 percent) were black or hispanic. As of July 6, 1981, 224 of 1,912 police officers were black or Hispanic; minority representation had risen to 11.7 percent. During the same period, 45 percent of the firefighters hired were black or Hispanic. By July 6, 1981, minority representation had increased to 14.7 percent in the fire department.

On July 7, 1981, the Boston Police and Fire Departments commenced programs of reductions in force of police officers

and fire fighters (1st Cir. P. App. 23). The departments "separated" officers from service "because of [a] lack of money." (1st Cir. P. App. 25; 27). The lay-offs were to be accomplished in compliance with the seniority provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws c. 31, §39. (1st Cir. P. App. 25; 27).

The stipulation of facts projected, and the district court found, that the July and August reductions in force contemplated by the City, if carried out according to Mass. Gen. Laws c. 31, §39, would reduce the percentage of black and Hispanic sworn personnel in the Police Department to 6.2 percent. (1st Cir. P. App. 45). The reductions proposed by the Fire Department would have dropped minority representation from 14.7 to 9.1 percent. The district court also found that the "minority population of Boston

has increased during the intervening decade to 30 percent." Id.

Against this backdrop of officer layoffs and concomitant reductions in black and Hispanic representation, the "modification" at issue was ordered.9/

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. Introduction: This Petition Raises Important Questions Regarding the Relationship Between the Remedial Powers of the Federal Judiciary And the Authority of the States to Establish Seniority Systems for State and Local Government Employees.

9/ Subsequent to the modification, state legislation significantly improving Boston's financial situation was enacted, Mass. St. 1982, c. 190, enabling the city to rehire the public safety personnel it had previously been forced to terminate. Because the bill only addressed Boston's financial situation, however, and not that of the other municipalities covered by the consent decrees entered in these cases, and because the provisions of Mass. St. 1980, c. 580 ("Proposition 2 1/2"), see fn. 11, infra, may require an additional round of layoffs in many municipalities in the next fiscal year, plenary review of the First Circuit decision remains essential.

This petition presents to the Court the question whether a federal district court may supersede a valid state civil service seniority statute in order to maintain percentages of minority members in municipal police and fire departments in the face of significant layoffs in those departments. The question is significant for several reasons. First, it raises important questions regarding the relationship between the federal judiciary and seniority systems duly established by state law. The Court has previously afforded bona fide private seniority systems significant protection: it has held that a disproportionate impact on last-hired minorities does not, standing alone, invalidate facially neutral seniority systems. International

Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). The recent application of this principle in American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S. Ct. 1534 (1982), and Pullman Standard v. Swint, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 1783-84 (1982) reflects a stabilization of the standards the Court applies to bona fide seniority systems.

The extension of federal judicial power in this case to municipal layoffs, however, overriding a valid statutory seniority provision, contradicts these standards. The Court's recent decisions have upheld private seniority rights, American Tobacco, supra, and Pullman Standard, supra. This petition for the first time presents seniority issues within the framework of federal-state relations. Consequently, the question

is substantial and new to the Court.

Second, contrary to previous opinions of this Court, the district court's order bears no relation to the scope of the constitutional violations found in prior proceedings in these cases. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974). The court abused its equitable power by ordering that minority percentages be frozen in the absence of findings that the individual minority officers afforded relief were victims of past discrimination or that the layoff of officers pursuant to the state statute would have constituted an independent violation of their rights. Pasadena v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 433-437 (1976).

The question presented is also significant because the legal underpinnings of the original findings of

discrimination in the police and fire cases were explicitly discredited by this Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.12 (1976). 10/ Despite this pronouncement of disfavor, both lower court decisions under review justified the scope of the district court's order by reference to the violations found in the original suits. Their reliance on violations which rested on discredited legal grounds contravenes the principles of Washington v. Davis and thus presents a significant question for plenary review by the Court: Notwithstanding the broad scope of the remedial powers of the federal courts, can these powers be invoked to preserve affirmative action gains which were the result of an erroneous decision?

10/ See pp. 39-42, infra.

The petition also raises significant Tenth Amendment questions. Where, as here, the federal judicial power has intruded into precisely the same core function of state sovereignty -- supervision of public safety employment -- identified by the Court in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) as essential to the "independent existence" of states, the nature and scope of that intrusion warrants full review by the Court.

Finally, the question presented warrants plenary review because of its widespread importance. Recent municipal layoffs have prompted a spate of federal litigation. See, e.g., Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1981); Stotts v. Memphis Fire Department, 679 F.2d 541, (6th Cir. 1982); Morgan v. O'Bryant, 671 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1982); Youngblood v.

Dalzell, 568 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1978). Additional litigation may be reasonably presumed in an era of decreasing municipal revenues and concomitant reductions in municipal services. 11/ This Court's decision of the question presented would define the scope of federal court authority in this novel legal context and thereby obviate the emergence of divergent trains of law from the lower courts.

11/ At the November, 1980, general election, acting under the initiative process of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the voters adopted as chapter 580 of the Acts of 1980 a tax limitation measure commonly known as Proposition 2 1/2. The principal tax limitation feature of Mass. St. 1980, c. 580, restricts most cities' or towns' total annual assessments against their real and personal property to 2 1/2% of the fair cash value of that property. See generally, Massachusetts Teachers Association v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, Mass. Adv. Sh. (1981) 1764, 424 N.E. 2d 469.

In light of the important questions raised by this petition, a writ of certiorari should issue.

II. The Lower Courts Erred By Superseding A Valid Massachusetts Statute Never Challenged In This Case.

Plaintiffs' request to modify the district court's prior orders grew out of their dissatisfaction with application of Massachusetts General Laws Ann. c. 31, §39, to the layoff of police and firemen. 12/ Under §39, if permanent employees are "separated" from their positions they are separated according to seniority. Thus the least senior employees are separated first.

12/ Section 39 is reproduced in the addendum to this petition at 2a-3a.

Section 39 has never been challenged in the long histories of the police and fire cases. Nor was it challenged in plaintiffs' "motion to modify prior remedial orders." Despite its continuing validity, however, both the district court and the court of appeals suspended its operation and ordered that percentages of minority officers be maintained despite layoffs in the respective departments. Suspension of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 31, §39, in this case represented an abuse of the district court's equitable power and an intrusion into the prerogatives of the Massachusetts Legislature. Contrary to previous opinions of this Court, the remedy imposed by the district court bore no relation to the scope of any constitutional violation found in the prior proceedings in these cases. Furthermore, the legal

basis for the original violations, viz., unintentional discrimination,[13/] was discredited by the Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The petitioners analyze each of these considerations in turn.

While the reach of federal equitable power is broad, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971), it is not plenary; there are fundamental limitations on its exercise. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 282, 293, (1976). A federal court is required to tailor "the scope of the remedy" to fit "the nature and extent of the constitutional violation." Id. at 293-294, quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974).

13/ See pp. 39-42, infra.

While the district court found constitutional violations in the hiring process in 1971 and 1974, and while those findings afforded a basis for its initial orders requiring new examination and certification procedures and priority pooling, the adoption of those procedures established a racially neutral system of examination and certification for public safety positions, as well as a mechanism for increasing minority representation in the respective forces. Having established those systems, the district court's order requiring that a certain percentage of minority officers be maintained, despite layoffs and despite a valid state seniority statute, exceeded the court's authority. Cf. Pasadena City Bd. of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 433-435 (1976) (district court

exceeded its authority by enforcing desegregation orders so as to require annual readjustment of attendance zones to insure racial balance).

The fact that the percentages of minority officers on the police and fire forces remained less than the percentage of minorities in the City of Boston does not alter this conclusion. Indeed, Pasadena v. Spangler expressly dismissed this contention:

> It may well be that petitioners have not yet totally achieved the unitary system contemplated by this quotation from Swann. . . . But that does not undercut the force of the principle underlying the quoted language from Swann. In this case the District Court approved a plan designed to obtain racial neutrality in the attendance of students at Pasadena's public schools. No one disputes that the initial implementation of this plan accomplished that objective. That being the case, the District Court was not entitled to require the PUSD to rearrange its attendance zones each year so as to ensure that the racial mix desired

> by the court was maintained in perpetuity. For having once implemented a racially neutral attendance pattern in order to remedy the perceived constitutional violations on the part of the defendants, the District Court had fully performed its function of providing the appropriate remedy for previous racially discriminatory attendance patterns.

Id. at 436-437. Thus the Court defined the limit of federal equitable power by reference to the implementation of remedial devices, not by measuring progress toward remedial goals. Contra, Morgan v. O'Bryant, 671 F.2d 23, 26-27, 27n.5 (1st Cir. 1982)(absent "proceedings and proof showing that Boston's dual school system has been abolished," and that "desegregation remedial goals" have been "fully achieved," district court retained power to make orders premised on original constitutional violations).

14/ Where, as here, previous court orders eliminated racially discriminatory practices in the examination and certification of applicants for public safety positions, the fact that minority representation in the forces remained less than that in the city did not provide the district court with the authority to suspend a valid state statute to preserve those percentages.

The district court's order contradicts the Milliken v. Bradley formula

---

14/ The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Board of Education, recently filed a brief in opposition to the Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari in Boston Association of School Administrators and Supervisors v. Morgan, Supreme Court Docket No. 81-2124, and Local 66, Boston Teachers Union v. Boston School Committee, Supreme Court Docket No. 81-2306. These cases do not involve suspension of a valid state statute and the Commonwealth accordingly did not, and does not now contest the propriety of the lower court orders in the cases.

for another, related reason. Since the scope of a federal court's remedial orders must conform to the scope of the constitutional violation, it follows that a court may only impose burdens designed to remedy the actual effects of a prior legal violation in order to make the identified victims whole. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 525 n.4 (1980)(Stewart, J., dissenting). The district court's order, however, affords relief to all minority officers, whether or not they had been wrongfully denied certification by use of the discriminatory testing device. The district court conducted no hearings to identify those scheduled for layoff who had been victimized by the past discriminatory examination and certification practices. In fact, the orders benefited primarily those not harmed by past acts of discrimination, because the relief

protected individuals most recently hired. Thus, while the opinions of the district court and the court of appeals characterize the order as a remedial measure, "it plainly operates as a quota." Fullilove v. Klutzick, 448 U.S. 448, 541 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The order was not narrowly tailored to make an identified victim whole. Id. at 525 n.4 (Stewart, J., dissenting) Rather, it swept broadly, conferring benefits indiscriminately on victims and non-victims alike.

The court of appeals placed great emphasis on the fact that "underrepresentation" of minorities still existed in the forces, and that layoffs made according to seniority would "eviscerate"[15/]

15/ Subsequent events demonstrate that the injury to those laid-off was a

(footnote continued)

relief already ordered. 679 F.2d at 974. But if these considerations alone can justify the random award of constructive seniority embodied in the district court's order, and the suspension of a valid state statute, it will serve not merely as a basis for this remedial order, but rather as a permanent source of justification for an entitlement to a certain percentage of minority officers on the City's police and fire forces. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 539 (1980)(Stevens, J., dissenting).16/

(footnote continued)

temporary, economic injury. See fn. 9, supra.

16/ Ironically, the right to such an entitlement was expressly rejected by the trial judge in his opinion following remand, Castro v. Beecher, 365 F. Supp. 655, 659 (D. Mass. 1973):

(footnote continued)

Second, the district court abused its discretion by suspending operation of a valid state statute because the legal basis for the original findings of discrimination in the police case was explicitly discredited by this Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Without exception, every decision rendered in the police case has found that, to the extent discrimination occurred, that discrimination was unintentional. See, e.g., Castro v. Beecher, 334 F. Supp. 930, 934, 944, 948 (D. Mass. 1971); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 727 (1st Cir. 1972).

(footnote continued)

> [The desirability of a police force drawn from all groups] does not imply that any group is entitled to a quota, nor to a fraction roughly corresponding to the fraction of the total population which belong to that group.

In Washington v. Davis, however, the Court noted that various courts of appeal had erroneously held proof of a disproportionate impact sufficient, in the context of public employment, to prove racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court cited Castro v. Beecher as a case wrongly decided. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 244 n.12. Despite this express disapproval, the court of appeals justified the scope of the district court's order by reference to the violations found in the original suits. Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d at 974. The court stated that the "independent [constitutional] violations" found in the original suits distinguished the cases from related Title VII decisional

law,[17] and characterized the "basic issue at stake" in the cases as "the power of a court in a litigated discrimination case to ensure that relief already ordered not be eviscerated by seniority-based layoffs." Id. (emphasis added). While the petitioners do not contest the fact that discrimination claims were once litigated, and that findings were entered against them, they do contest present reliance on those discredited legal conclusions to justify the "modification" of the court's previous orders. Reliance on the original erroneous conclusions to supersede yet another Massachusetts law only compounds the lower court's original mistakes. The district court's power must be circumscribed by the disfavored

---

17/ See Section III, infra.

legal underpinnings of its original decisions. The lower courts' reliance on "violations" which rested on discredited legal grounds contravenes the principles of Washington v. Davis and therefore warrants plenary review by this Court.

III. The Decision of the First Circuit Contradicts Recent Decisions of This Court Upholding Bona Fide Seniority Systems.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act establishes that:

> [I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority . . . system . . . provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate[.]

42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(h).

The Court examined this language in

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). There the Court held that a neutral and bona fide seniority system is not unlawful under Title VII even if it perpetuates prior discrimination. Id. at 352-355. In Teamsters, the Court faced significant minority layoffs made in compliance with seniority strictures. Id. at 349-350. The Court held that a disproportionate impact on last-hired minorities does not, standing along, invalidate a facially-neutral seniority system. Id. at 352. See also Croker v. Boeing Co. (Vertol Div.), 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1188 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part, vacated on other grounds, Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975 (3rd Cir. 1981) (en banc).

Two recent Supreme Court decisions have reaffirmed these precepts.

American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, ___ U.S. ____, 102 S. Ct. 1534 (1982) (American Tobacco), and Pullman-Standard v. Swint, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S. Ct. 1781 (1982) (Pullman-Standard). Both cases addressed issues regarding the construction and application of 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(h). More importantly, both cases underscored the protection afforded bona fide seniority systems by the statute. American Tobacco stated that the statute "exempts from Title VII the disparate impact of a bona fide seniority system even if the differential treatment is the result of pre-Act racially discriminatory employment practices." Id. at 1541. The fact that independent, discriminatory employment practices are "perpetuated" by application of a bona fide seniority system does not form a

sufficient predicate for invalidation of the system. American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1541. Absent a discriminatory purpose in application or operation of the system, the system itself is not an unlawful employment practice even if the system has some discriminatory consequences. Pullman-Standard, 102 S. Ct. at 1784, citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 82 (1977).

Application of Mass. G.L. c. 31, §39 should be evaluated in accordance with these tenets. Since §39 sets forth precisely the type of seniority-based layoff system envisioned by Title VII and approved by the Supreme Court, it should control the layoffs in this case. Such a result accords with the congressional judgment that:

> . . . Title VII should not outlaw the use of existing seniority lists and thereby destroy or water down the vested seniority rights of employees simply because their employer had engaged in discrimination prior to the passage of the Act.

Teamsters, 431 at 352-353.

Here, however, the court of appeals found sufficient justification to override seniority rights. The court stated:

> We find nothing in this trilogy that precludes a court from ordering relief to remedy discrimination that exists apart from the adoption or application of a bona fide seniority system. . . . None of the Supreme Court cases apply to the basic issue at stake here; the power of a court in a litigated discrimination case to ensure that relief already ordered not be eviscerated by seniority-based layoffs. To hold a seniority system inviolate in such circumstances would make a mockery of the equitable relief already granted.

Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d at 974. See also Stotts v. Memphis Fire Department, 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir.

1982) (advancing several theories to permit consent decree to alter collective bargaining agreement seniority provisions). The court of appeals thus distinguished the cases before it from the Title VII precedents on the basis of: (1) the "independent," litigated findings of discrimination; and (2) the Court's power to preserve relief achieved pursuant to previous orders.

These considerations did not justify the relief ordered. The petitioners recognize that independent, litigated findings of discrimination in employment practices may entitle persons affected by those practices to full relief, including their rightful place in the seniority system, see Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1975); that such relief may insulate those

persons from the effects of a "last-hired, first-fired" layoff system; and that a court may act to insure that result. Only those affected by the discriminatory practices, however, may invoke such protection. For example, individuals who fail to timely challenge discrimination cannot later complain of a "continuing violation" embodied in the seniority system. Croker v. Boeing Co. (Vertol Div.), 437 F. Supp. at 1187. Similarly, those persons not victimized by past acts of discrimination should not be afforded relief that suspends valid statutory seniority provisions, because no factual predicate exists for such relief.

Notwithstanding these limitations on plenary relief, the district court's orders benefited primarily persons who neither challenged nor were harmed by

past acts of discrimination. See Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d at 976 and 976 n.14. The district court conducted no hearings to identify which of the police and firemen scheduled for layoff had been victimized by the past discriminatory examination and certification practices. Indeed the fact that the relief protects individuals most recently hired ensures that few, if any, members of the original class will benefit from the remedial orders. See id. at 976.

Thus, the distinction drawn by the court of appeals between this case and the Title VII decisional law upholding seniority rights -- "the litigated findings of discrimination" -- is unsupported by the factual record. In the absence of proof of discrimination as to each individual minority officer, class-wide

relief is improper. Under the circumstances, the lower courts lacked the authority to insulate persons not victimized by discrimination from the effects of the seniority system. The court's power to "preserve relief" was properly limited to insuring that the victims of discrimination retained their rightful place in the seniority system, protected from discharge under the "last-hired, first-fired" layoff system. See Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747, 762-770 (1975). The court's foray beyond that well-defined limit contravened relevant precedents of this Court and, accordingly, warrants plenary review.

IV. The Lower Court Decisions Contradict Principles Of Federalism Embodied In The Tenth Amendment And Applied By This Court In National League Of Cities v. Usery.

The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in relevant part:

> [T]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to its people.

United States Constitution, Amendment X. Thus, powers not delegated to the Federal Government either expressly or as incidental or implied powers are reserved to the states. Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Commission, 318 U.S. 261 (1943); United States v. Hubbard, 474 F. Supp. 64 (D.D.C. 1979). The Court in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), applied the Tenth Amendment as an affirmative limitation upon federal authority to enact legislation which directly impairs state autonomy in areas of government traditionally reserved to

the states. The Usery Court declared that by imposing wage and hour regulations upon states as employers, Congress had interfered with the ability of the states to make decisions affecting essential state functions. Id. at 851-52. The Court stated that authority "to structure employer - employee relationships in such areas as fire prevention, police protection . . . " was essential to the "independent existence" of states and thus was an integral element of state sovereignty. Id. Accord, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S. Ct. 2126, 2143 n.32 (1982); see id. at 2147-2157 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).

The seniority principle contained in Mass. Gen. Laws c. 31, §39, represents a

legislative exercise of traditional state authority. Moreover, in the context of this case, application of §39 represents the identical function -- regulation of employment in public safety positions -- found by the Usery court to be essential to a state's "independent existence." 18/ Under these circumstances, Usery counsels that a federal court should not

---

18/ The First Circuit in State of New Hampshire v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240, 248-49 (1st Cir. 1980), distinguished Usery in its review of application of the 1976 amendments to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act to New Hampshire's Unemployment Compensation Law. In its discussion of "impairment of state sovereignty," id. at 248, the Court concluded that the extension of unemployment benefits to certain employees of New Hampshire would not alter the ability of the state to "structure" its "employer-employee relationships" in, inter alia, public safety positions. In the present case, however, abrogation of §39 represents a significant alteration of that ability.

interfere, by "modification" of prior orders, with an essential state function absent a finding that the applicable state law is unconstitutional. The lower court decisions in this case, superseding a valid state statute, contravene rights reserved to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by the Tenth Amendment. Here the provisions of a presumptively valid state statute have been set aside notwithstanding the fact that no direct challenge to the statute was ever mounted. The justification for past action is the remedial authority of the court, i.e., its ability to implement an eleven year old decision which this Court has already described as erroneous. Such action necessarily enervates the Tenth Amendment and its underlying doctrines.

Plenary review by the Court is therefore warranted.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, a writ of certiorari should issue to review the judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI
ATTORNEY GENERAL



Thomas R. Kiley
First Assistant Attorney General
Thomas A. Barnico
Assistant Attorney General
One Ashburton Place, Room 2019
Boston, Massachusetts 02108
617-727-1004
Marc S. Seigle
Special Assistant Attorney General
One Union Street
Boston, MA 02108
617-367-1055

Date: August 9, 1982

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES INVOLVED

Constitution of the United States

Amendment X

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

Amendment XIV

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

United States Code

42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(h)

(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earn-

ings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title 29.

Massachusetts General Laws Ann.

ch. 31, §39

If permanent employees in positions having the same title in the departmental unit are to be separated from such positions because of lack of work or lack of money or abolition of positions, they shall, except as hereinafter provided, be separated from employment according to their seniority in such unit and shall be reinstated in the same unit and in the same positions or positions similar to those formerly held by them according to such seniority, so that employees senior in length of service, computed in

accordance with section thirty-three, shall be retained the longest and reinstated first. Employees separated from positions under this section shall be reinstated prior to the appointment of any other applicants to fill such positions or similar positions, provided that the right to such reinstatement shall lapse at the end of the five-year period following the date of such separation.

Any action by an appointing authority to separate a tenured employee from employment for the reasons of lack of work or lack of money or abolition of positions shall be taken in accordance with the provisions of section forty-one. Any such employee who has received written notice of an intent to separate him from employment for such reasons may, as an alternative to such separation, file with his appointing authority, within seven days of receipt of such notice, a written consent to this being demoted to a position in the next lower title or titles in succession in the official service or to the next lower title or titles in the labor service, as the case may be, if in such next lower titles or titles there is an employee junior to him in length of service. As soon as sufficient work or funds are available, any employee so demoted shall be restored, according to seniority in the unit, to the title in which he was formerly employed.

Nothing in this section shall impair the preference provided for disabled veterans by section twenty-six.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 60(b)

(b) On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C., §1655, or to set aside a

judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.

82-259

Office - Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
AUG 19 1982
ALEXANDER L. STEVAS
CLERK

NO.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1982

NANCY B. BEECHER, et al.,
Petitioners,

v.

BOSTON CHAPTER, NAACP, et al.,
and
PEDRO CASTRO, et al.,
Respondents.

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI
ATTORNEY GENERAL

THOMAS R. KILEY
First Assistant Attorney General
One Ashburton Place
Boston, MA 02108

Counsel of Record

THOMAS A. BARNICO
Assistant Attorney General
MARC S. SEIGLE
Special Assistant Attorney General
Government Bureau,
One Ashburton Place
Boston, MA 02108
(617) 727-1004

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
APPENDIX A. Opinion of the First Circuit, Boston Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965 (1st Cir. 1982).	1
APPENDIX B. Opinion of the District Court, 522 F.Supp. 873 (D. Mass. 1981).	64
APPENDIX C. Judgment Of The First Circuit	91

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

Nos. 81-1642
81-1656
81-1650
81-1651

BOSTON CHAPTER, NAACP, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

NANCY B. BEECHER, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
BOSTON FIREFIGHTERS UNION, LOCAL 718,
Intervenor-Appellant.

PEDRO CASTRO, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

NANCY BEECHER, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
BOSTON POLICE PATROLMEN'S ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Intervenor-Appellant.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT

FROM THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Andrew A. Caffrey, U.S. District Judge]

(522 F.Supp. 873)

Before

Campbell, Bownes and Breyer,

Circuit Judges.

E. David Wanger, with whom John F. McMahon, and Angoff, Goldman, Manning, Pyle & Wanger, P.C. were on brief, for Intervenor, Appellant Local 718 in Case No. 81-1642.

Frank J. McGee, on brief for Intervenor-Appellant Boston Police Patrolmen's Association, Inc.

Thomas A. Barnico, Assistant Attorney General, Government Bureau, Department of the Attorney General, with whom Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, was on brief, for the State Defendants Appellants in Case No. 81-1651.

Marc S. Seigle, Special Assistant Attorney General, with whom Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, was on brief, for the State Defendants-Appellants in Case No. 81-1656.

James S. Dittmar, with whom Berman, Dittmar & Engel, P.C., Judith Bernstein Tracy, and Peggy A. Wiesenberg were on brief, for plaintiffs-appellees.

May 11, 1982

BOWNES, Circuit Judge. This case arises from a conflict between a statutorily established seniority system mandating layoffs on a last hired, first fired basis and court orders insulating a percentage of minorities from such system. Shortly after the July 1981 beginning of fiscal 1982, the Police and Fire Departments of the City of Boston embarked upon a program of massive reductions in force, allegedly precipitated by budgetary restrictions imposed by "Proposition 2 1/2." During the six year period prior to the commencement of the layoffs, both departments had been steadily increasing the percentage of their black and hispanic members pursuant to consent decrees designed to remedy the present and continuing effects of past racial discrimination. The consent decrees were silent as to layoffs. If this

reduction in force were conducted according to strict seniority as prescribed by Massachusetts law, 1/ roughly half of the blacks and hispanics hired would be laid off. To prevent this substantial undoing of the progress made in integrating blacks and hispanics into police and fire departments, the district court granted plaintiffs' motions in these four consolidated cases to modify the prior consent decrees by prohibiting both departments from reducing the percentage of blacks and hispanics in their respective work forces below the level obtaining at the commencement of the force-reduction program. Defendant Massachusetts Civil Service Commission (the Commission) and intervenors Boston

---

1/ Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 31, § 5.

Firefighters Union, Local 718, and Boston Police Patrolmen's Association, Inc., have appealed.

There are three fundamental issues: did the district court have the power to modify the consent decrees and, if so, did its orders impermissibly supersede a valid Massachusetts civil service statute or unconstitutionally impose reverse discrimination.

In order to understand the issues and to analyze properly the district court's modification of the consent decrees, it is necessary to begin by tracing the prior proceedings. 2/

2/ We refer throughout this opinion to Castro et al. v. Beecher et al. and related proceedings as the "police case." The police case is reported at 334 F. Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 1971); 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); 365 F. Supp. 655 (D. Mass. 1973); 386 F. Supp. 1281 (D. Mass. 1975). Similarly, we refer to Boston

(footnote continued)

The Police Case

Plaintiffs, unsuccessful black and hispanic candidates for appointment as Boston Police officers, commenced the police action in 1970. They claimed racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 in connection with the recruitment and certification practices established by the Massachusetts Civil Service Commission and implemented, through appointment procedures, by the Boston Police Department

---

(footnote continued)

Chapter, NAACP, Inc., et al. v. Beecher, et al., and related proceedings, as the "fire case." The fire case is reported at 371 F. Supp. 507 (D. Mass. 1974); 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); 423 F. Supp. 696 (D. Mass. 1976). Both the police and fire cases were reported most recently in Chief Judge Caffrey's consolidated opinion, 522 F. Supp. 873 (D. Mass. 1981), from which this appeal arises.

as well as other appointing authorities, 3/ including other Massachusetts cities and towns and various state agencies. Castro et al v. Beecher et al., 334 F. Supp. 930, 934 (D. Mass. 1971)(Wyzanski, J.).

Following trial, the district court made extensive findings, including findings that in 1970, blacks represented 16.3 percent of the population of Boston but only 3.6 percent of its police force. The district court also found that the 1968-1970 Massachusetts Civil Service Police Entrance Examinations were not job related and discriminated against minorities, including plaintiffs, who did not share "prevailing white culture."

3/ Among the named defendants were the Metropolitan District Commission, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, and the Capitol Police. 334 F. Supp. at 934.

Id. at 943. It enjoined the Commission from issuing further certifications based on these examinations.

We held on appeal that the examinations were racially discriminatory, and remanded the case with instructions that the district court enter a remedial order requiring a nondiscriminatory, job-related examination and providing for certification of black and hispanic applicants on a priority basis, to be determined in accordance with guidelines that we set forth. Castro et al. v. Beecher et al., 459 F.2d 725, 730-31, 737-38 (1st Cir. 1972). We noted that the prescribed remedy "will yield a significant increment of black and Spanish-surnamed police officers in the near term" and insisted that relief fashioned by the district court "is to be more than token." Id. at 737.

On remand, after observing that unlike most consent decrees, this one had been preceded by full hearings, findings of fact, conclusions of law and several opinions both of the district and appellate courts, the district court approved a comprehensive consent decree, finding that it was "just, reasonable, and in the public interest, and more likely than any other proposed solution to give the people of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts effective, non-discriminatory, dedicated, and honorable police forces . . . ." 365 F. Supp. 655, 660 (D. Mass. 1973). The decree provided, among other measures, for the creation of civil service certification priority pools, consisting of black and hispanic applicants, and for the implementation of affirmative recruitement programs aimed at this group. Id. at 660-62.

In 1975 plaintiffs instituted another action under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §1651, seeking to clarify and preserve the effects of the district court's decree in light of litigation that had taken place in Massachusetts courts relating to the rights of cities and towns to grant statutory preferences to residents and veterans in appointing police officers. The court (Caffrey, C.J.) held that the prior decree did not displace these statutory preferences except insofar as the preferences must be applied within the several groups of applicants established by the decree. 386 F. Supp. 1281, 1285 (D. Mass, 1975). It urged that the parties agree upon a substitute consent decree and recommended they follow the one adopted in the fire case, Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v Beecher et al., 371 F. Supp. 507 (D. Mass. 1974),

aff'd, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975). Id. at 1286. 4/

Thereafter the parties entered into a further consent decree, which the district court approved on July 7, 1975.

4/ The consent decree finally agreed upon in the police case directed that four groups of eligible police officer candidates be established for each requisitioning police department:

Group A consisted of minority applicants who failed discriminatory police entrance exams administered between 1968-1970 but who passed the 1972 interim exam and were otherwise qualified;

Group B consisted of persons on three eligibility lists established in 1970-1971;

Group C consisted of minority candidates not in Group A who passed the 1972 interim examination and were otherwise qualified.

Group D consisted of all other persons who passed the 1972 interim exam and were otherwise qualified.

The consent decree in the fire case contained essentially identical groups of candidates, except it stated that the discriminatory exams targeted by the priority pools were administered from August 1968 to August 1971.

This decree mandated, among other things, certification of police applicants by methods essentially designed to facilitate the appointment in Boston and Springfield of one minority police officer for each white officer, and to expedite minority appointments by other appointing authorities on a ratio of one to three. The decree provided that these remedial measures should apply to any city or town with a minority population of one percent or more until the police force of the municipality "achieves a complement of minorities commensurate with the percentage of minorities within the community," at which time further certification would be made according to existing Massachusetts law. 5/

5/ This parity target also applied to the state agencies enumerated in note 3

(footnote continued)

The same parity target had already been set in the fire case.

On July 13, 1976, and on June 1, 1979, the district court approved and entered supplemental consent decrees that provided, among other measures, for continuation of the consent decree's method and ratios for certification, for further affirmative recruitment activities, and for monitoring of the civil service examination. They also discharged from further judicial supervision the police departments of cities and towns that had attained the parity target acccrding to then current census statistics.

In the spring of 1981, the Boston Police Department initiated the reduction

---

(footnote continued)

supra, relative to the percentage of minorities in the communities served by those agencies.

in force program. Thereafter, on April 6, 1981, plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 60(b) to modify prior remedial orders. Following state funding legislation that led to a rescinding of the layoff program for fiscal 1981, plaintiffs requested that the court continue their motion until the program was reinstituted. In the first week of July 1981 the police department reactivated the layoff program, and on July 30, 1981, the district court (Caffrey, C.J.) heard plaintiffs' motion together with a similar motion in the fire case. On August 7, 1981, the opinion and order issued enjoining the Boston Police Department and Fire Department from reducing the percentage of minority officers below the level existing at the commencement of the layoff program.

The Fire Case

Unsuccessful black and hispanic applicants for appointment as City of Boston fire fighters and the Boston Chapter of the NAACP commenced the fire case in 1972. As in the police case, the plaintiffs claimed racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 in connection with recruitment and certification practices established by the Massachusetts Civil Service Commission and implemented, through appointing procedures, by the Boston Fire Department as well as by other appointing authorities.

In 1973 the Attorney General of the United States brought an action raising similar claims, together with Title VII claims, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the two actions were consolidated.

Following hearings, the district court made extensive findings, including findings that blacks represented approximately 16 percent of Boston's population, that the combined minority population was 23 percent of the total, and that blacks and hispanics represented only 0.9 percent of the fire department's sworn personnel. Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher et al., 371 F. Supp. at 514 (Freedman J.). The court treated the hearings on plaintiffs' challenge to the fire fighters' entrance examination as a trial on the merits pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 65(a)(2) and found that plaintiffs had established an unrebutted case of racial discrimination. The court found, as evidenced by the "insignificant" number of blacks and hispanics certified, that the examinations administered from 1968 through

August 1971 were discriminatory. It also found that the word-of-mouth recruitment policy resulted in racial discrimination, albeit unintentional. Id. at 510, 517 & 519-20. 6/

To afford "affirmative relief to remedy the present effects of past discrimination," the district court ordered a program of active recruitment of minority fire fighters, enjoined further certification based upon the results of the discriminatory examinations, ordered development of a job-related examination, and

---

6/ The district court concluded that defendants had not rebutted plaintiffs' prima facie case of discrimination established by the statistical disparity between the percentage of minority fire fighters in various fire departments and the relevant local population; it found that the entrance exams were not job related. Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher et al., 371 F. Supp. 507, 517 (D. Mass. 1974), citing Castro et al. v. Beecher et al., 459 F.2d 725, 732 (1st Cir. 1972).

required establishment of priority certification groups for black and hispanic applicants. Id. at 520-23. It ordered that the remedial measures mandated by its decree remain in force for any city or town with a minority population greater than one per cent until the fire department of the municipality "achieves a complement of minorities within the community" at which time "certifications will be made according to existing Massachusetts law." Id. at 523.

We affirmed, holding that plaintiffs had demonstrated that the Massachusetts civil service test had a disproportionate impact on minority hiring and that defendants had not demonstrated job relatedness. Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher et al., 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975). See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401

U.S. 424 (1971). Regarding the of an appropriate remedy, we noted that in the police case we had required the district court to institute remedial measures "as a means of ameliorating the continuing effects of past discrimination . . . ." Id. at 1026. We approved the district court's decree, including the provision that the decree would remain in effect until any particular fire department attains "sufficient minority fire fighters to have a percentage on the force approximately equal to the percentage of minorities in the locality." Id. at 1027. We reasoned that the district court's color-conscious relief did not violate the Constitution because it "goes no further than to eliminate the lingering effects of previous practices that bore more heavily than was warranted on

subject minorities," id. and that "our society [is] well served by taking into account color in the fashion used and carefully limited in extent and duration . . . ." Id. We also rejected defendants' contention that the relief was barred by section 703(j) 7/ of Title

---

7/ Section 703(j) of Title VII provides:

Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex. or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex or national

(footnote continued)

VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j). Id. at 1027-28.

Since the 1974 decree, the district court has entered several interim consent decrees and stipulations to effectuate its original order. These subsequent orders have set procedures for administration of new examinations, establishment of eligibility lists, affirmative recruitment, and notice and reporting.

The Facts

The statistics are undisputed. At the time of the original filing of these actions, racial discrimination had led to the virtual exclusion of blacks and hispanics from Boston's Police and Fire

---

(footnote continued)

origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or other areas.

42 U.SC. § 2000e-2(j)

Departments. In 1970, only 65 of 2,805 police officers were black or hispanic, representing but 2.3 percent of the total. 459 F.2d at 728 n.1, 730. As of 1974, only 18 of 1,983 fire fighters were black or hispanic, representing only 0.9 percent of the total. 371 F. Supp. at 514. In contrast, the minority popula- tion of Boston was more than 16 percent in 1970, 459 F.2d at 728, and approxi- mately 23 percent by 1974. 504 F.2d at 1020 n.4.

The district court's remedial orders in both cases have produced marked progress eliminating the present and continuing effects of past discrimination. Between 1974 and 1980, the Boston Police Department hired 492 officers, of whom 213 (43 percent) were black or hispanic. On July 6, 1981, 248 out of a total of 1,912 officers were black or hispanic;

minority representation had risen to 11.7 percent. Between 1974 and 1980, the Boston Fire Department hired 553 fire fighters, of whom 248 (45 percent) were black or hispanic. On July 6, 1981, 248 out of a total of 1,690 fire fighters were black or hispanic; minority representation had increased in this department to 14.7 percent.

By 1980, however, the black and hispanic population of Boston had risen to between 29 and 30 percent, almost double the percentage of ten years prior.

Early in July 1981 both the Police and Fire Departments of the City of Boston commenced a systematic program of reduction in force. The city's program proposed six weekly layoffs, running from early July to mid-August. The police and fire departments planned to make these layoffs pursuant to the Mass-

achusetts civil service statute, which requires separations from service in reverse order of seniority. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 31, § 39.

Such a layoff program was certain to cause a devastating reduction in the number of black and hispanic officers on both forces. The police department planned to lay off 252 officers, of whom 122 were black or hispanic. Of the officers to be laid off, 48 percent were minority, 8/

8/ The Supreme Court has approved of racial preferences granted to "minority" groups of divergent composition. Compare United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (blacks only) with Fullilove, et al. v. Klutznick, Sec. of Commerce, et al., 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts). Throughout this opinion, our references to "minority" group members pertain to blacks and hispanics only. Whether a particular individual qualifies as a "minority" group member entitled to relief according to this definition has not been raised by the parties and we proffer no opinion on that question.

which comprised 54.5 percent of the department's entire complement of minority officers. The fire department planned to lay off 207 officers, of whom 113 (54.6 percent) were black or hispanic; this constituted 45.6 percent of all minorities on the force. Unbridled operation of the force-reduction program would have dramatically cut minority representation in both the police and fire departments. By mid-August 1981 only 103 of 1,660 police officers would have been black or hispanic, and minority representation would have fallen from 11.7 percent to 6.2 percent. By mid-August only 135 of 1,483 fire fighters would have been black or hispanic, and minority representation in that department would have dropped from 14.7 percent to 9.1 percent.

Moreover, although as of July 30, 1981, city officials intended to proceed with only six waves of layoffs, there was no certainty that further force reductions would not occur.

The Decision Below

In its August 7, 1981 consolidated opinion, the district court made the specific findings outlined above. It then found, on the basis of the entire record in both cases, that "the massive firings claimed by municipal authorities to be the result of the voters enacting Proposition 2 1/2 amount to 'new and unforeseen conditions' . . . ." Castro et al. v. Beecher et al., 522 F. Supp. at 877. It ruled that, in light of the remedial objective of both consent decrees,

> namely bringing minority representation up to a level approximating the percentage of the total population which the minorities represent in the community, . . . if anything similar to Proposition 2 1/2 had been in ef-

> fect at the time that the remedial decrees were entered, these decrees would have been fashioned to make allowances for terminations so that the minority representation on both departments could have been maintained if not increased notwithstanding the then hypothetically ongoing terminations.

Id.

The court also concluded that the denial of the relief sought would reverse the results of the court's prior remedies, would "allow the substantial eradication of all progress made by blacks and hispanics" in securing positions as police officers and fire fighters, and would produce a "grevious wrong." Id. Accordingly, the Boston Police Commissioner and Fire Commissioner were enjoined from reducing, "pursuant to any departmental or city program of reduction in force on account of lack of funds or abolition of position," the percentage

of minority officers below that obtaining at the commencement of the program. Id. at 877-78. Neither the Police Commission nor the Fire Commissioner has appealed.

I. THE COURT'S POWER TO REVISE THE CONSENT DECREE

We initially determine whether the district court was empowered to modify its prior remedial orders because of the impending layoffs . At the outset we note that defendants settled both the police case, filed originally under section 1981 and 1983, and the fire case, commenced under these sections as well as Title VII, by entering into remedial consent decrees. They did so only after the liability issues had been extensively litigated, resulting in well-supported determinations at the district and circuit levels (with certiorari having been

sought and denied in the fire case), that defendant's certification and recruiting procedures were discriminatory because they had produced an underrepresentation of blacks and hispanics in the police and fire departments, and that these procedures lacked justification in terms of job-relatedness. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424.

The first question is whether Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), bar the relief ordered because intentional discrimination was not proved. We find no bar. It is by no means clear that our decisions in the police and fire cases should have been different had they been decided after Washington v. Davis and Arlington

Heights, but in any event the pattern of relief which the present modifications in the decrees seek to preserve was conclusively established prior to those decisions. Neither case stands in the way of the district court's modification of the consent decree. Sarabis v. Toledo Police Patrolman's Ass'n, 601 F.2d 914, 919 (6th Cir. 1979); Bolder v. Penn. State Police, 73 F.R.D. 370, 371-72 (E.D. Pa. 1976).

We have carefully reviewed the original complaints, the language contained in the decrees, and all district and circuit court opinions in these cases. We can only conclude that the purpose of the decrees and the intervening orders was to eliminate the present and continuing effects of defendants' past discrimination. We reject appellants' contention

that the original decrees and subsequent modifications limit relief to correcting features of the certification process found to have violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights as to hiring. These cases encompass the overall issue of shaping ongoing relief so as to eliminate the condition precipitating the original decrees: gross discriminatory underrepresentation of persons in the fire and police departments who are not members of the "prevailing white culture." 9/ Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 729-31 (1st Cir. 1972); see Milliken v.

9/ Prior orders and stipulations in both cases have dealt with matters going beyond civil service certification measures, including employment of provisional employees, recruiting, appointment targets, rejection of applicants, the effects of statutory preferences for veterans and local residents, mental and physical testing, and firing. See, e.g., 371 F. Supp. at 521-22; 365 F. Supp. at 661-62.

Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971); cf. Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 768 (3d Cir. 1978) (in banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923, reh'g denied, 447 U.S. 916 (1980).

The district court based its authority to reshape the consent decrees on its finding that the dramatic reduction in minority representation in these departments constituted a showing of a "grevious wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions," citing the Supreme Court in United States v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932). Swift involved an antitrust defendant that sought to avoid its obligations pursuant to a consent decree due to changed market conditions. Perhaps a more apt standard was set out by the Supreme Court in United States v.

United Shoe Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968), wherein plaintiffs in an antitrust dispute sought revision of their remedy designed to produce "workable competition." Id. at 249. There, the Court held that modification was appropriate because time and experience had demonstrated that the decree had failed to accomplish its intended result. Id. See also System Federation v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647 (1961). In any event there can be no question of the power of a court of equity, upon a sufficient showing, "to modify an injunction in adaptation to changed conditions though it was entered by consent." United States v. Swift, 286 U.S. at 114. Here, there was ample showing that changed circumstances would totally vitiate the intended effect of the original decrees unless the proposed

modifications were made.

Nor do we think that plaintiffs should be penalized for failing, in negotiating the decrees, to have foreseen the unprecedented change in state and local fiscal policy resulting in the extensive layoff programs. We agree with the district court that, had the parties anticipated any measure such as Proposition 2 1/2, they would have incorporated some provision addressing its potential impact into the decrees. Failure to take the action here challenged would result in undoing most all that had been accomplished by the original decrees.

The Sixth Circuit's treatment of a virtually identical layoff situation in Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1981), lends considerable support to our conclusion that modification was within

the court's power. In Brown, findings of prior illegal discrimination by the Toledo Fire Department formed the predicate of a consent decree entered into by the city, which set as a goal that the city "achieve within 5 years a fire department which reflected the racial composition of the city as a whole." Id. at 555. The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's authority to order the same type of modification of the original decree as in this case, reasoning that the language in the decree, although silent as to the effect of layoffs, and the circumstances surrounding the entry of the decree, compelled the conclusion that the "city agreed that it had a constitutional duty to eliminate discrimination in the hiring of firefighters." Id. at 562-63. The Brown court distinguished its denial of similar relief in

Youngblood v. Dalzell, 568 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1978), because in Youngblood, unlike Brown, there had been no finding of prior discrimination; the original decree contained language expressly denying that Cincinnati Fire Department had discriminated in its past hiring practices. Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d at 561 and n.18.

Here, as in Brown, the defendants entered into consent decrees upon "capitulating to judicial findings of past discrimination." Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d at 562 and n.20; Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, April 17, 1975 Interim Consent Decree (fire case) App. at 90-91; Castro v. Beecher, 365 F. Supp. at 656. Both decrees contain language that warrants concluding that the certifying and appointing authorities are under an

affirmative duty to integrate the police and fire departments until the percentage of blacks and hispanics in both departments approximates that of the general population. 10/ In addition, neither decree contains any exculpatory language as in Youngblood. And, as in Brown, if the district court undertook no modification, the layoffs would have eroded significantly, if not completely destroyed, the affirmative action progress made to date. See Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d at 560. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the district court had the authority to modify the consent decrees in the light of new and unforeseen conditions.

10/ See, e.g., June 27, 1975 (police case), App. at 122-23; April 17, 1975 Interim Consent Decree (fire case), App. at 93.

We next address the issues of whether the relief ordered was proper and constitutional.

II. THE COURT ORDER VERSUS THE MASSACHUSETTS SENIORITY STATUTE

To implement its order prohibiting the Boston Police and Fire Departments from reducing the current level of minority representation, the district court required the maintenance of separate minority and nonminority lists with respect to seniority, reemployment and reinstatement. To this extent, therefore, the district court's order superseded the operation of the reverse seniority layoff provisions of the Massachusetts civil service statute, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 31, §39. 11/ Most of the cases

---

11/ Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 31, §39 provides in pertinent part:

(footnote continued)

dealing with the inherent conflict between affirmative action programs and vested seniority rights have concerned private employers and Title VII. And, until recently, the dispute has mainly centered on hiring and promotion.

(footnote continued)

> If permanent employees in positions having the same title in a departmental unit are to be separated from such positions because of lack of work or lack of money or abolition of positions, they shall, except as hereinafter provided, be separated from employment according to their seniority in such unit and shall be reinstated in the same unit and in the same positions or positions similar to those formerly held by them according to such seniority, so that employees senior in length of service, computed in accordance with section thirty-three, shall be retained the longest and reinstated first. Employees separated from positions under this section shall be reinstated prior to the appointment of any other applicants to fill such positions or similar positions, provided that the right to such reinstatement shall lapse at the end of the five-year period following the date of such separation.

There are three Supreme Court cases that focus on the problem of seniority rights and discrimination against minorities. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), and American Tobacco Co., et al. v. Patterson, et al., 50 U.S.L.W. 4364 (April 5, 1982). In Franks the district court had found that the employer had discriminated in making hiring, transfer, and discharge decisions, all of which occurred after July 2, 1965, the date on which the prohibition against racial discrimination under Title VII took effect as to private employers. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. at 751, 758 n.10. The Supreme Court held that section 703(h) of Title VII, 42

U.S.C. §2000e-2(h) [12] did not "modify or restrict relief otherwise appropriate once an illegal discriminatory practice occurring afterthe effective date of the

---

12/ Relevant portions of §703(h) of Title VII provide:

> Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(h).

Act is proved," id. at 761-62, and "that class-based seniority relief for identifiable victims of illegal hiring discrimination was a form of relief generally appropriate under §706(g)." Id. at 779; accord, Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 346-48; EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167, 174 (3d Cir, 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978), see Ass'n Against Discrimination v. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256, 278 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 397 (1981); Guardian's Ass'n of New York City v. Civil Service, 633 F.2d 232, 249-54 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3083 (1981); Chance v. Board of Examiners & Bd. of Educ., 534 F.2d 993, 1007 (2d Cir. 1976) (reh'g in banc), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977).

In Teamsters the Court did not retreat from the rule set forth in Franks, but dealt instead with the effect of section 703(h) on awarding retroactive seniority to redress prior discrimination that had occurred both before and after the effective date of Title VII. The district court in Teamsters had found that the employer had discriminated by implementing hiring, assignment and promotion policies that caused black and hispanic employees to occupy the lower paying and less desirable jobs. 431 U.S. at 329-31. As to those plaintiffs claiming that they had been discriminated against after the effective date of Title VII, the Court stood firm on its Franks ruling. Id. at 347. But the Court denied relief to those plaintiffs alleging discrimination that occurred prior to the

effective date of the Act and held that an "otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system does not become unlawful under Title VII simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination." Id. at 353-54.

The most recent case, American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 50 U.S.L .W. 4364, dealt with the question whether § 703(h) applied to seniority systems adopted after the effective date of Title VII, July 2, 1965. After an exegesis of the statutory history of Title VII, the Court concluded that §703(h) immunizes a bona fide seniority system whenever adopted unless intentional discrimination was proven. Id. at 4367-68. American Tobacco Co. did not explicitly over rule the holding of Franks that §703(h) does not bar appropriate relief if an illegal

discriminatory practice occurring after the effective date of the Act is proved.

We find nothing in this trilogy that precludes a court from ordering relief to remedy discrimination that exists apart from the adoption or application of a bona fide seniority system. The original consent decrees in the cases before us, decided long before the Supreme Court cases, were directed at such independent violations, the use of discriminatory certification examinations. None of the Supreme Court cases apply to the basic issue at stake here; the power of a court in a litigated discrimination case to ensure that relief already ordered not be eviscerated by seniority-based layoffs. To hold a seniority system inviolate in such circumstances would make a mockery of the equitable relief already granted.

Two recent Second Circuit cases are analogous to our situation. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service, 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980), cert . denied, 101 S. Ct. 3083 (1981), was an action brought under Title VII, Title VI and 42 U.S.C. §1981 by black and hispanic members of the New York City Police Department, alleging that layoffs carried out pursuant to a last hired, first fired plan were discriminatory because the Department's entry examinations administered during the years 1968 to 1970 were discriminatory, and that but for such discrimination plaintiffs would have been hired earlier and thus would have accrued sufficient seniority to withstand being fired. The court upheld the district court's findings that the use of such tests as late as 1974 violated Title VII. It held that §703(h) did not "immunize

post-Act hiring on the basis of an eligibility list reflecting performance on pre-Act discriminatory examinations." Id. at 253. In Association Against Discrimination v. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3695 (March 3, 1982) (Nos. 81-373, 81-374), the Second Circuit affirmed its holding in Guardians that a municipality could be held liable under Title VII for post-Act hiring based on a pre-Act discriminatory hiring list. Id. at 272-74.

It is now settled that remedies to right the wrong of past discrimination may suspend valid state laws. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 328 (8th Cir. 1961) (reh'g in banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); United States v. Mississippi, 339 F.2d 679 (5th Cir.

1964); United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1963). See generally Note, Last Hired, First Fired Layoffs and Title VII, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1544, 1557-60 (1975).

We emphasize that the district court orders do not completely nullify the seniority statute. Nor do they mandate the firing of any particular employees. The orders allow the statute to be followed so long as the level of minority representation is not reduced beyond that which prevailed at the time the personnel reductions began. The order was designed to operate within the framework of the statute, although modifying it to the extent necessary to preserve the integration already achieved.

We hold that the court's orders prevail over the Massachusetts seniority statute.

III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ORDERS

Appellants argue that the orders discriminate against minorities and thus are unconstitutional. 13/ We first define the issue. This case does not involve an award of constructive seniority to individuals who have been discriminated against; the orders require that there be a certain percentage of minorities on the Police and Fire Departments without regard to whether the individuals comprising the minority percentage were the actual victims of past discrimination.

We turn to the Supreme Court cases, in addition to those already discussed,

---

13/ As a threshold matter, we find that appellants did preserve the reverse discrimination argument for appeal by suggesting the applicability of the reasoning in Chance v. Board of Examiners & Bd. of Educ., 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977), at the July 30, 1981 hearing before Judge Caffrey.

bearing on the issue. The first case is McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 286-87 (1976), which held that section 1981 protects whites as well as blacks from racial discrimination in private employment.

Next came University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). A divided court upheld so much of the judgment of the Supreme Court of California declaring the University's special admission program based on racial quotas unlawful. Id. at 270-71. It reversed, however, that portion of the California court's judgment enjoining the University from according any consideration to race in its admission process. Id. at 272.

United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 889 (1980), comes closer to our

problem. In Weber the Court held that Title VII does not bar voluntary, private affirmative action undertaken by an employer in collaboration with a union, even when the plan is racially preferential or accomplished through a quota, so long as the plan is directed to eliminating "conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories." Id. at 208-09. Although the court declined to "define in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action," id. at 208, it noted that "the plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees. The plan does not require the discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black hirees." Id.

The fourth Supreme Court case that bears, albeit tangentially, on the issue

is Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). This case upheld the power of Congress to require in a congressional spending program that "10% of the federal funds granted for local public works projects must be used by the state or local grantee to procure services or supplies from businesses owned and controlled by members of statutorily identified min- ority groups." Id. at 453.

Although these decisions issued from a sharply divided court and were marked by separate concurrences and dissents, we think it is now firmly established that remedial relief for the effects of past discrimination need not be color-blind and that the use of minority-conscious percentage goals and quotas to overcome the present and ongoing effects of past discrimination is constitutionally permissible. See United States v.

City of Miami, Fla., 614 F. 2d 1322, 1335 (5th Cir. 1980) and cases cited therein. We also think that Weber implicitly approves the use of such remedies in sections 1981 and 1983 cases as well as Title VII cases. See Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962, 966-67 (8th Cir. 1981) and cases cited therein.

None of the Supreme Court cases, however, involve public employment nor address directly the situation before us; the conflict between a last hired, first fired seniority system and court orders seeking to maintain some semblance of racial balance in municipal Police and Fire Departments. There is no blinking the fact that there is significant difference between hiring and promoting in accord with a race-conscious ratio and insulating from discharge a percentage of employees because they are members of

a minority group. In the former situation, there is only a postponement of expectations; in the layoff situation, employees with greater seniority lose their jobs. See Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 696 n.12 (6th Cir. 1979); Judge Skelly Wright Color-Blind Theories and Color Conscious Remedies, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 213, 238-40 (1980).

We do not think the issue can be resolved by simply following the Title VII cases and awarding constructive seniority to those minority members of the departments that can show that they were discriminated against by the entry examinations given in 1968-1970. This is not an action for damages. The relief sought originally was not for individuals, but to correct a condition of racial imbalance. We do not know the

exact effect the award of constructive seniority to the identifiable victims of the past discrimination would have on the minority percentages of the departments. Considering, however, that more than ten years have passed, we do know that such a limited remedy would result in minority ratios far below that set by the district court. 14/

It must be stressed that the orders here do not require the continuation of

---

14/ In response to an inquiry at oral argument, we have been informed that the earliest seniority date of minority police officers laid off is June 1980, and the earliest seniority date of laid off white police officers is December 30, 1970. We have also been told that of the 258 police officers laid off, 34 are of the minority and that if it were not for the order of the district court, 130 minority officers, 126 white officers, and 2 oriental officers would have been laid off. As a result of the order, 81 minority officers were recalled so as to maintain the 11.7% minority representation in the department. On a percentage

(footnote continued)

the affirmative action programs by the hiring of minorities and the firing of whites. All they do is preserve the status quo at a 14.7 percent minority ratio for fire fighters and 11.7 percent for policemen. Against a background of a present 30 percent minority population in Boston, this hardly can be deemed overreaching. Nor do we think it can fairly be characterized as "unnecessarily trammeling" the interest of the whites. United States v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. The fact of past discrimination agreed to in both cases constitutes a "compelling need" for a minority-conscious remedy. The proper test is one of reason-

---

(footnote continued)

basis, the district court's order means that a little more than 13% of those laid off are members of the minority group.

ableness. See Morgan, et al. v. O'Bryant, et al., Nos. 81-1561, 1617,1618, 1619, and 1646, slip op. at 10-11 (1st Cir. February 17, 1982). The orders of the district court meet the test of reasonableness. They were necessary to prevent the departments from regressing to the state of precipitous racial imbalance that prevailed at the commencement of this litigation more than ten years ago.

We are actuely aware that some white policemen and fire fighters who, understandably, regard the seniority system as an inalienable right and who have been innocent themselves of any discrimination will lose their jobs, at least temporarily.[15/] We also must recognize

---

15/ If a fire fighter or police officer with permanent civil service status is laid off as a result of a reduction in force, that individual will be placed on

(footnote continued)

that whites as a group reaped significant advantages in the past in hiring and promotion at the expense of blacks and his- panics and that a last hired, first fired seniority system perpetuates the past exclusion of minorities. This is not a case of wrong

---

(footnote continued)

reemployment list by the Director of Personnel Administration. A reemployment list establishes for a laidoff fire fighter or police officer the right to be certified to all municipalities for a period of two years from his layoff, ahead of all other per- sons eligible for appointment as police officers or fire fighters. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 31, §40. In addition, a police officer or fire fighter has the right to be reinstated to a vacancy within the department from which he was laid off for five years after the date of his termination--again with preference over all other eligible applicants. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 31, § 39.

The probable extent of recalls in both departments is not yet clear, although some evidence does exist that in fact reinstatement of at least some of the laid-off employees has taken place or will occur.

or right; it is a case of two competing rights, earned seniority versus racially balanced police and fire departments.

An important factor in these cases is that they involve the police and fire departments of a large metropolitan city that now has a minority population of at least 30 percent. We are concerned here not with simply redressing the rights of individuals who suffered racial discrimination; the issue is whether the progress made to date in integrating the departments will be preserved. As Judge Wyzanski noted, the public interest requires a racially balanced police force. Castro v. Beecher, 365 F. Supp. at 660. We do not need expert testimony to make the point that, unless the public safety departments of a city reflect its growing minority population, there is bound to

be antagonism, hostility and strife between the citizenry and those departments. The inevitable result is poor police and fire protection for those who need it most.

> The argument that police need more minority officers is not simply that blacks communicate better with blacks or that a police department should cater to the public's desires. Rather, it is that effective crime prevention and solution depend heavily on the public support and cooperation which result only from public respect and confidence in the police. In short, the focus is not on the superior performance of minority officers, but on the public's perception of law enforcement officials and institutions.

Detroit Police Officers Officer's Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 696 (6th Cir. 1979).

It is significant that the only circuit case directly on point, Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d at 564, held: "To the extent that the seniority system is an

obstacle to the city of Toledo's duty to eliminate past discrimination the district court can set it aside."

We find no constitutional bar. It is now accepted that minority-conscious quotas can be used as a tool to prevent discrimination and advance integration of the work force in hiring and promotion situations. The imposition of constructive seniority to offset the effects of a last hired, first fired system has been used with increasing frequency since Franks in Title VII cases. While the orders place a relatively greater share of the burdens of the layoffs upon non-minorities, this does not constitute "reverse discrimination." The layoffs here were bound to cause undeserved injury in any event. While seniority was the normal way to decide who must go first, there is nothing magical about seniority,

and here common sense suggests that it should be tempered by other entirely rational considerations so that the racial equity achieved at considerable effort in the past decade not be erased. In Bakke, not an employment case, the Supreme Court refused to enjoin the University from giving any consideration to race in its admissions process. It is a simple fact that discrimination against blacks and other minorities was long accepted and condoned in this country. To a minority police officer or fire fighter hired within the last ten years, the imposition of a rigid last hired, first fired seniority system would only mean that once again the dominant white culture had protected its own kind at the expense of blacks and hispanics. If the evil of racial discrimination is to be fought openly, we must not allow our-

selves to be caught in a semantic web of aphorisms such as "reverse discrimination" that in the final analysis serve only to perpetuate the discrimination of the past.

We rule that the district court had the equitable power to modify the consent decrees, that the Massachusetts statutory last hired, first fired seniority system is not insulated from the court's orders, and that the orders are not unconstitutional.

Affirmed.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

PEDRO CASTRO, ET AL,
Plaintiffs,

v.

NANCY B. BEECHER, ET AL,
Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NOS.
70-1220-C
70-2982-C

ORDER

August 7, 1981

CAFFREY, Ch. J.

This matter having come on for hearing on plaintiffs' motion to modify prior remedial orders; and the Court having considered the prior proceedings had herein, further evidence regarding proposed reductions in force affecting the Police Department of the City of Boston, the parties' briefs and the arguments of counsel; and the Court having found that a material change in circumstances --

namely, the effective and proposed reductions in force -- would nullify the Court's prior remedial orders and frustrate the intent of those orders; and the Court having found that modification of those prior remedial orders through entry of the within order is necessary to prevent that consequence, it is therefore,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1. The defendant Commissioner of Police of the City of Boston is hereby restrained and enjoined from reducing, pursuant to any departmental or city program of reductions in force of police personnel on account of lack of funds or abolition of position, the percentage of black and Spanish-surnamed post-probationary police officers in the City of

Boston Police Department below the level of 11.7 percent of all such officers.

2. For the purpose of implementing this order, the defendant Commissioner of Police of the City of Boston shall establish and maintain separate seniority lists of post-probationary police officers, one for minority officers and one for non-minority officers and shall use such separate lists in implementing any program of reductions in force on account of lack of funds or abolition of positions. Within each separate seniority list, the seniority of each officer shall be computed pursuant to statute, M.G.L. c. 31, §33.

3. As police officers in the Boston Police Department are separated from

their positions because of lack of funds or abolition of positions, the defendant Fire Commissioner may terminate officers according to strict seniority until the reduction in force results in a reduction of the percentage of black and Spanish-surnamed police officers below 11.7 percent. At that point, the Commissioner shall utilize separate seniority lists for minority and non-minority police officers and shall terminate the least senior police officers from each of the two lists according to a mathematical ratio so that the percentage of black and Spanish-surnamed officers at no time falls below 11.7 percent. Nothing herein shall disturb application of Massachusetts statutory preferences; provided that such preferences are applied

solely within the separate seniority lists.

4. In the event that a police officer's appeal of his termination to the defendant members of the Massachusetts Civil Service Commission challenges the method of termination set forth herein, the defendant members of the Civil Service Commission are hereby restrained and enjoined from disapproving, invalidating or interfering with the termination on that basis.

5. For the purpose of continuing the implementation of this court's prior orders, the defendant Personnel Administrator is ordered to place the names of all City of Boston police who are laid off for lack of funds or abolition of position on the Civil Service re-employment and reinstatement lists in the

order in which they are laid off. Reinstatement and re-employment of firefighters on such lists shall be accomplished by the Personnel Administrator and by the Commissioner of Police in reverse order of such layoffs and in a manner so that the percentage of black and Spanish-surnamed officers does not fall below 11.7 percent. The Personnel Administrator, upon receipt of any requisition for hiring, shall certify names from such lists prior to certifying names from any other lists.

6. The parties are instructed to confer and negotiate with respect to any further practices and procedures necessary and appropriate for the implementa-

tion of the provisions of this order.

Andrew A. Caffrey, Ch. J.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

PEDRO CASTRO, ET AL,
Plaintiff,

V.

CIVIL ACTION NOS.
70-1220-C
74-2982-C

NANCY B. BEECHER, ET AL,
Defendants.

BOSTON CHAPTER, NAACP, ET AL,
Plaintiffs,

v.

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 72-3060-C

NANCY B. BEECHER, ET AL,
Defendants.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

v.

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 73-269-C

CITY OF BOSTON, ET AL,
Defendants.

OPINION

August 7, 1981

CAFFREY, Ch. J.
These four cases, all of which have long since gone to judgment, are before

the Court on motions filed by the plaintiffs in each case to modify prior remedial orders. All four cases raise substantially the same legal issue, i.e. may the City of Boston in conducting reductions in force in the Boston Police and Fire Departments decide which police officers and which firemen to terminate on the basis of seniority as directed by M.G.L. c.31 §39, or must the City of Boston maintain the percentage of minority representation existing as of July 6, 1981 by persons who are either black or hispanic.

The past history of this litigation may be summarized as follows: The police case was begun and assigned to the Honorable Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., who tried the case and entered a judgment, after which an appeal was taken to the First Circuit and the Court of Appeals filed

an opinion giving directions for further proceedings by Judge Wyzanski. Judge Wyzanski made additional rulings and then subsequent litigation in the police case was assigned to and handled by the undersigned, including the monitoring of remedial measures. (For further background information see the undersigned's opinion of January 7, 1975 reported in 386 F.Supp. 1281.)

For present purposes suffice it to say that this action was commenced in 1970 by unsuccessful black and hispanic candidates for appointment as Boston Police officers. Plaintiffs claimed racial discrimination in the recruitment and certification practices initiated by the Massachusetts Civil Service Commission and implemented, through appointment procedures by the police forces of the

City of Boston, other cities and towns, and other appointing authorities subject to Massachusetts Civil Service regulations. Following trial, Judge Wyzanski made extensive findings, including findings that, in 1960, blacks represented 9 percent of the population of Boston and but 2 percent of its police force and, in 1970, 16.3 percent of the population and but 3.6 percent of the police force. Judge Wyzanski also found that the Massachusetts Civil Service Police Entrance Examination discriminated against minorities who did not share mainstream white culture. Judge Wyzanski held that plaintiffs had been discriminated against. 334 F.Supp. 943 (1971).

Appeal followed to the First Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the civil

service examinations were racially discriminatory. The Court of Appeals remanded the case with instructions that the district court enter a remedial order providing for implementation of a substantially job-related examination and providing for certification of black and hispanic applicants on a priority basis to be determined, under guidelines recommended by the Court of Appeals, by the District Court. The Court of Appeals insisted that relief "is to be more than token." 459 F.2d 725, 737 (1972).

On remand Judge Wyzanski approved and entered a comprehensive consent decree, finding that it was "just, reasonable and in the public interest, and more likely than any other proposed solution to give the people of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts effective non-discrimi-

natory, dedicated, and honorable police forces . . . ." 365 F.Supp. 655, 660 (1973). The remedial order provided, among other measures, for the establishment of civil service certification priority pools consisting of certain black and Spanish-surnamed applicants, and for the implementation of affirmative recruitment programs for the purpose of recruiting black and Spanish-surnamed police applicants. Id. at 660-662 (1973). Immediately prior to approval of the consent decree, Judge Wyzanski had issued an opinion exhorting the parties to reach agreement on the provisions of the decree, in the course of which he observed:

> there is a prima facia presumption that on a job-related examination which is reasonably set to meet merely the requirements (and not something above the requirements) of a police patrolman's job, the percentage of successful black and Spanish-speaking persons in the

population of the Commonwealth. Id. at 655.

In 1975 plaintiffs brought an action pursuant to the All Writs Act for the purpose of clarifying and preserving the effect of the prior consent decree in light of proceedings which had taken place in the Massachusetts Superior and Supreme Judicial Courts upon applications by certain Massachusetts cities and towns to establish the right to appoint police officers in accordance with certain statutory preferences. The action was assigned to the undersigned, who subsequently has supervised all aspects of the two consolidated police cases, including holding that statutory preferences were not displaced by the prior consent decree except to the extent that the preferences must be applied within the several groups established by the priority appointment procedures

contained in the consent decree. I also further requested the parties to arrive at a substitute consent decree and recommended the remedy adopted in NAACP v. Beecher, 371 F.Supp. 507 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1975). 386 F.Supp. 1281 (1975).

Thereafter, all parties entered into a consent decree, approved and entered by the Court on July 7, 1975. This consent decree provides, among other measures, for the establishment of priority certification groups for police applicants, for an affirmative recruitment program for black and hispanic applicants and for procedures for administration and reporting with respect to police entrance examinations. This decree required certification of police applicants by methods in essence designed to facili-

tate the appointment by Boston and Springfield of one minority policeman for each white policeman, and to facilitate the appointment by other appointing authorities on a ratio of one to three. The decree also provided that the method and ratios of certification provided for by the decree shall apply to all cities and towns which have a minority population of one percent or more until any such city or town "achieves a complement of minorities commensurate with the percentage of minorities within the community," at which point further certification will be made in accordance with existing Massachusetts law. This parity target had been established by the Court in the NAACP v. Beecher decree to which I previously directed the parties.

On July 13, 1976, the writer approved and entered a supplemental consent decree. This decree contained further administrative procedures for monitoring the continuing implementation of prior decrees. This decree also exempted from further application of the method and ratios of certification contained in the July 7, 1975 consent decree the police departments of 81 cities and towns which had attained parity of the percentage of blacks and hispanics in police service with the percentage of blacks and hispanics in municipal population according to then current census statistics. Ninety one cities and towns plus the MBTA, MDC and Capitol Police forces remain subject to the decree.

On June 1, 1979 I further approved and entered an agreement as to the May,

1978 examination which provided, among other measures, for the continuing applicability of the method and ratios for certification provided for by the 1975 consent decree and for further recruitment activites and monitoring of the civil service examination.

As found in prior proceedings, in 1970 the Boston Police Department employed 2805 officers. Sixty-five of these were black or Spanish-surnamed, representing 2.3 percent. 459 F.2d at 718, 730. At the same time, the population of the city was 16.3 percent black. Id. at 728.

Since 1973, as a result of implementation of this Court's orders, Boston has increased the representation of minorities in the Police Department from 2.3 percent to 11.7 percent. Pursuant to the methods, ratios and procedures

provided for by prior decrees, the Boston Police Department has hired, between 1974 and the present, 451 police officers, of whom 243 (53.88 percent) have been white and 208 (46 percent) have been Black, Spanish-surnamed and other minorities. However, the minority population of Boston has increased during the intervening decade to 30 percent. The percentage of black and hispanic officers in the police Department, therefore, remains far below the percentage of minorities in the city and the parity level which the Court's prior remedial orders were designed to achieve.

Against this background, the City of Boston presently plans, and has begun to implement, massive reductions in work force in Boston police and fire departments for alleged reasons of fiscal

austerity.

I find on the basis of stipulations entered into by the parties on July 29, 1981, that reductions in force now being conducted, and scheduled for completion on August 18, 1981, would reduce minority representation in the police force to 6.2%, contrasted with the 11.7% as of July 6, 1981. Similar reductions in the Fire Department, to be completed on August 12, 1981, would leave a 9.1% minority representation, as compared with the 14.7% level of July 6, 1981.

The litigation involving the members of the Fire Department has followed a substantially similar course down through the years and is described with far greater specificity than is necessary for present purposes in an opinion filed by Judge Freedman on February 8, 1974, reported in 371 F.Supp. 507 (1974). The

firemen's cases were later transferred from Judge Freedman to the Honorable John J. McNaught in whose temporary absence the firemen's cases are also being handled by the undersigned.

Given the foregoing, it should be noted that contrary to specious arguments for counsel for the state respondents, this motion does not constitute the filing of a new complaint, does not warrant respondents filing an answer, and does not require a new trial. Stating the matter affirmatively, this motion is a request that this Court modify a remedial decree which it has been monitoring for many years. The Court clearly has power to do so on the basis of both Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and under its inherent equitable power. It was so ruled by the

Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106 (1932) where (at page 115) the Supreme Court stated:

> A Court does not abdicate its power to revoke or modify its mandate if satisfied that what it has been doing has been turned through changing circumstances into an instrument of wrong.

The standard to be followed by a district court in deciding whether and when to exercise its inherent right to modify a remedial decree was also stated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Swift (at page 119) where the Court told us:

> Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what was decreed after years of litigation.

I rule on the basis of the entire record of these cases from 1970 to date:

1. that the orders previously entered in all of these cases were decreed

after years of litigation;

2. that the massive firings claimed by municipal authorities to be a result of the voters enacting Proposition 2 1/2 amount to "new and unforeseen conditions" within the Swift ruling; and

3. that if this Court fails to modify the decree, as requested by plaintiffs' motions, then a grievous wrong would be produced by this Court's non-action, i.e. a refusal to amend the remedial order would allow the substantial eradication of all progress made by blacks and hispanics in securing public employment as members of either the police or fire departments since 1970.

4. that it is obvious from the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit that using M.G.L. c.31 §39 to de facto reverse all of the

results granted over the past 11 years would not be tolerated by that Court. Cf. Brown v. Neeb, C.A. No. 72-282, July 3, 1980 (N.D. Ohio); aff'd March 3, 1981 (6th Cir.).

It should be noted in view of the argument by various respondents that the earlier remedial decrees do not talk about terminations, that the argument first of all is factually fallacious in that both Judge Wyzanski and this writer have made reference to terminations, see Section IV, para. 5(e), Consent Decree by Wyzanski, J., 365 F.Supp. 655, 662 (1973), and para. 19(b), Consent Decree by Caffrey, Ch. J., unreported July 7, 1975. Secondly, and more importantly, it is beyond argument that, given the nature of the remedial decrees directed by the Court of Appeals, and given the objective thereof, namely bringing

minority representation up to a level approximating the percentage of the total population which the minorities represent in the community, that if anything similar to Proposition 2 1/2 had been in effect at the time that the remedial decrees were originally entered, these decrees would have been fashioned to make allowances for terminations so that the minority representation on both departments could have been maintained if not increased notwithstanding the then hypothetically ongoing terminations.

Accordingly, I rule that an order should enter granting plaintiffs' motions to modify prior remedial orders and enjoining respondents from reducing the percentage of black and hispanic police officers on the City of Boston police force below the 11.7% of July 6, 1981,

and enjoining the City of Boston from reducing the number of black and hispanic members of the Fire department below the 14.7% of July 6, 1981.

Andrew A. Caffrey, Ch. J.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 81-1642

BOSTON CHAPTER, NAACP, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
NANCY B. BEECHER, ET AL.,
Defendants, [Appellants],

BOSTON FIREFIGHTERS UNION, LOCAL 718,
Intervenor, Appellant.

No. 81-1650

PEDRO CASTRO, ET AL.,
Plaintiff, Appellees,
v.
NANCY BEECHER, ET AL.,
Defendants, [Appellants].

BOSTON POLICE PATROLMEN'S
ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Intervenor, Appellant.

No. 81-1651

PEDRO CASTRO, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
NANCY BEECHER, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellants.

No. 81-1656

BOSTON CHAPTER, NAACP, ET AL,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
NANCY B. BEECHER, ET AL.,
Defendants, [Appellants],

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ET AL,
Defendants, Appellants.

JUDGMENT

Entered: May 11, 1982

This cause came on to be heard on appeal from the United States District Court for the District of MASSACHUSETTS, and was argued by counsel.

Upon consideration whereof, It is now here ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows: The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

By the Court:

Dana H. Gallup, Clerk

No. 82-259-CFX
Status: GRANTED

Title: Nancy B. Beecher, et al., Petitioners
v.
Boston Chapter, NAACP, et al.

Docketed:
August 9, 1982

Court: United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit

Vide:
82-246
82-185

Counsel for petitioner: Kiley, Thomas R.

Counsel for respondent: Dittmar, James S., McMahon, John F., McGee, Frank J.

Entry	Date	Note	Proceedings and Orders
1	Aug 9 1982	G	Petition for writ of certiorari filed.
2	Aug 9 1982		Appendix of petitioner Nancy B. Beecher filed.
3	Oct 4 1982		Brief of respondent Boston Ch., NAACP in opposition filed. VIDED.
4	Oct 6 1982		DISTRIBUTED. October 29, 1982
5	Nov 1 1982		Petition GRANTED. The case is consolidated with Nos. 82-185 and 82-246 and a total of one hour is allotted for oral argument.
			**********
6	Dec 16 1982		Brief amicus curiae of Equal Employment Advisory Council filed. VIDED.
7	Dec 17 1982		Joint appendix filed. VIDED.
8	Dec 17 1982		Brief of petitioner Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718 in 82-185 filed. VIDED.
9	Dec 17 1982		Brief of petitioner Boston Police Patrolmen's Association in No. 82-246 filed. VIDED.
10	Dec 17 1982		Brief amicus curiae of United States filed. VIDED.
11	Dec 17 1982	G	Motion of American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae filed.
13	Dec 18 1982		Record filed.
14	Dec 18 1982		Cert. orig. record & proceedings received, 1 blue folder & 2 boxes.
15	Dec 17 1982	G	Motion of Pacific Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae filed.
16	Dec 22 1982		Brief amicus curiae of United States filed. VIDED.
17	Dec 28 1982		Brief of petitioners Nancy B. Beecher, et al. filed. VIDED.
18	Dec 27 1982	D	Motion of Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718, for divided argument filed.
19	Dec 27 1982	D	Motion of Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718 for additional time for oral argument filed.
21	Dec 30 1982		Order extending time to file brief of respondent on the merits until February 6, 1983.
22	Dec 16 1982	G	Motion of Washington Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae filed.
23	Dec 30 1982	D	Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument filed.
24	Dec 29 1982		Application for leave to file respondents' brief on the

No. 82-259-CFX

Entry	Date	Note	Proceedings and Orders
			merits in excess of the page limitations filed.
25	Dec 29 1982		Order granted by Brennan, J., on December 30, 1982. Brief may not exceed 75 pages.
26	Jan 3 1983	D	Motion of Boston Police Patrolmen's Association, Inc. for divided argument filed.
27	Jan 3 1983	D	Motion of Boston Police Patrolmen's Association, Inc. for additional time for oral argument filed.
28	Jan 3 1983	G	Motion of Nancy B. Beecher, et al. for divided argument filed.
29	Jan 10 1983		Motion of Washington Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae GRANTED. Justice Marshall OUT.
30	Jan 10 1983		Motion of American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial GRANTED. Justice Marshall OUT.
31	Jan 10 1983		Motion of Pacific Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae GRANTED. Justice Marshall OUT.
32	Jan 12 1983	G	Motion of Thomas R. Kiley, Esquire, to permit Thomas A. Barnico, Esquire, to present oral argument pro hac vice on behalf of petitioners in No. 82-259 filed.
33	Jan 17 1983		Motion of Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718, for divided argument DENIED. Justice Marshall OUT.
34	Jan 17 1983		Motion of Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718 for additional time for oral argument DENIED. Justice Marshall OUT.
35	Jan 17 1983		Motion of Boston Police Patrolmen's Association, Inc. for divided argument DENIED. Justice Marshall OUT.
36	Jan 17 1983		Motion of Boston Police Patrolmen's Association, Inc. for additional time for oral argument DENIED. Justice Marshall OUT.
37	Jan 17 1983		Motion of Nancy B. Beecher, et al. for divided argument GRANTED. Justice Marshall OUT.
38	Jan 17 1983		Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral DENIED. Justice Marshall OUT.
39	Jan 17 1983		DISTRIBUTED. Jan. 21, 1983. (Motion of Thomas R. Kiley to permit Thomas A. Barnico to present oral argument).
40	Jan 24 1983		Motion of Thomas R. Kiley, Esquire, to permit Thomas A. Barnico, GRANTED. Justice Marshall OUT.
41	Feb 4 1983		Brief amicus curiae of Natl. Bar Assn., et al. filed. VIDED.
42	Feb 7 1983		Brief amicus curiae of League of United Latin American Citizens, et al. filed. VIDED.
43	Feb 7 1983	G	Motion of National Education Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae filed.
44	Feb 8 1983		Brief amicus curiae of National Black Police Assoc. et al. filed. VIDED.
45	Feb 9 1983		Brief of respondents Boston Ch., NAACP filed. VIDED.
46	Feb 9 1983		Brief amicus curiae of Officers For Justice, et al. filed. VIDED.
47	Feb 9 1983		Brief amicus curiae of City of Detroit filed. VIDED.
48	Feb 8 1983		Brief amicus curiae of Affirm. Action Coordinating Center, et al. filed. VIDED.
49	Feb 10 1983		Brief amicus curiae of NAACP, Legal Defense & Educational Fund filed. VIDED.

No. 82-259-CFX

Entry	Date	Note	Proceedings and Orders
50	Feb 10 1983		Brief amicus curiae of Robert Lipshutz filed. VIDED.
51	Feb 22 1983		Motion of National Education Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae GRANTED. Justice Marshall OUT.
52	Mar 8 1983		Brief amicus curiae of Natl. Org. for Women, et al. filed.
53	Mar 11 1983		CIRCULATED.
54	Mar 21 1983	D	Motion of American Jewish Congress for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae filed.
55	Mar 24 1983		SET FOR ARGUMENT. Monday, April 18, 1983. (4th case) The case is consolidated with Nos. 82-185 & 246 (1 hr.)
56	Mar 28 1983		Motion of American Jewish Congress for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae DENIED. Justice Marshall OUT.
57	Apr 11 1983	X	Reply brief of petitioner Nancy B. Beecher filed. VIDED.
58	Apr 12 1983	X	Reply brief of petitioner filed. VIDED.
59	Apr 18 1983		ARGUED.